What Did the CIA Tell President Bush About Iraq?
Earlier today, Scott discussed a recent article by Paul Pillar, in which Pillar defended the CIA’s performance on Iraq. Pillar, who was largely responsible for Iraq intelligence, wrote about the Senate Intelligence Committee’s release of two reports that were authored by the National Intelligence Council, under Pillar’s direction, in January 2003: Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq and Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq. Pillar begins with an admission that the intelligence community was wrong about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. The thrust of his argument, however, is that the existence of WMDs did not mandate the overthrow of Saddam, and that, if the administration had paid proper heed to the intelligence community’s other reports, it would not have invaded Iraq.
This, then, raises the question: what did the CIA and other intelligence agencies predict would happen if we invaded Iraq? Did they foresee the events that have in fact unfolded over the last four years, or not?
This question is of great interest in its own right, but it also fits into a broader inquiry. Most people, I think, believe that post-war Iraq has been more or less a disaster. Many of those who supported the war in 2003 now say that the concept was good, but the execution has been bungled. Pillar argues, however, that a review of the pre-war intelligence assessments yields a different conclusion:
The story of these pre-war assessments has other implications that are at least as important, however, including ones for current debate over Iraq policy. The assessments support the proposition that the expedition in Iraq always was a fool’s errand rather than a good idea spoiled by poor execution, implying that the continued search for a winning strategy is likely to be fruitless.
Pillar argues that what we have seen since 2003 is not far off from what his agency predicted before the war began—that we have done, on the whole, about as well as could be expected. Pillar thinks this means that the war was a mistake; the alternative interpretation is that we are not actually doing so badly in Iraq, and the problem is largely one of expectation and perception. Over the coming days, I want to look more closely at what was foreseen before the war was launched, what reasonably should have been foreseen, and how the reality that we now confront stacks up in comparison.
For now, though, let’s consider the narrower question: how accurately did the intelligence community foresee what would happen in Iraq after Saddam’s fall?
What strikes me most forcibly about the intelligence reports that have been made public in recent years is how little help they would have provided to a decision-maker. Everything is couched in “on the one hand, on the other hand” terms. Pros and cons are set forth, but what is the conclusion? In the end, the decision-maker is given little guidance. The overriding purpose of the January 2003 intelligence reports seems to be covering the CIA and the other intelligence agencies, so that, no matter what the outcome, they could say with hindsight that whatever happened was at least hinted at in their analyses.
Were the Intelligence Council’s January 2003 assessments “gloomy,” as Pillar describes them? Yes and no. The report titled Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq certainly emphasized that the path to democracy would be a difficult one. The report recited the well-known rivalries among Shia, Sunni and Kurdish Iraqis. But it didn’t say that these rivalries would doom our post-war efforts. On the contrary, it drew positive conclusions about Iraq’s cohesion as a nation:
Shia actions during the Iran-Iraq war—their defense of Iraq in the name of Iraqi nationalism—demonstrated the extent to which a sense of national identity had been established along the Shia-Sunni fault line.
And again:
Despite these societal fissures, Iraq would be unlikely to split apart. Most Iraqis have national identity and pride in being Iraqi that transcends their ethnic and religious differences. More significantly, the alternatives are not attractive.
Similarly, the report warned that the transition to democracy would be long and hard:
The building of an Iraqi democracy would be a long, difficult, and probably turbulent process, with potential for backsliding into Iraq’s tradition of authoritarianism.Iraqi political culture does not foster liberalism or democracy. Iraq lacks the experience of a loyal opposition and effective institutions for mass political participation.
Does that mean that the CIA concluded that promoting democracy would be futile, and that consequently, in Pillar’s words, the removal of Saddam would be a “fool’s errand?” Not at all. On the contrary, in its usual “on the other hand” style, the Intelligence Council recited the factors that, according to conventional wisdom, made Iraq a relatively good candidate for democratization:
The principal positive elements in any effort at democratization would be the current relative weakness of political Islam in Iraq and the contributions that could be made by four million Iraqi exiles—many of whom are Westernized and well-educated—and by the now-impoverished and underemployed Iraqi middle class. ***A stable and democratic Iraqi political system, if one emerges, is likely to be the result of a long evolution that supplants traditional loyalties and practices.
Here as elsewhere, it is striking how much the intelligence community’s assessment mirrored the conventional wisdom that any newspaper reader would have absorbed in 2002. The Intelligence Council’s repeated fretting that an invasion of Iraq may cause the “Arab street” to explode, and its obsessive references to Israel and the Palestinians—as if Israel were somehow of decisive importance for Iraq!—sound for all the world like New York Times editorials of the period. To say, in short, that there are no dramatic revelations in these documents is an understatement.
In one of the few areas where the intelligence community made tangible predictions, they turned out to be too optimistic. The agencies believed that Iraq’s oil resources could readily be exploited post-war, and would lend a huge boost to Iraq’s economic recovery:
Multiple studies from worst case to best case put Iraq’s oil export earnings at $8-37 billion annually in the first year or two after sanctions are lifted, depending on the price of oil and potential damage to Iraq’s oil infrastructure during conflict. ***If a successor authority in Baghdad were perceived by investors as both politically and economically stable, Iraq’s massive proven oil reserves—second only to Saudi Arabia—could be a significant lure to foreign investment. This could permit Baghdad to expand its oil output rapidly—by an average of 500,000 barrels per day (b/d) per year for several consecutive years—rivaling the recent pace of expansion in Russia and making Iraq the second largest oil exporter in the world after Saudi Arabia as early as 2005.
That didn’t happen, obviously. But let’s get to the bottom line. To what extent did the intelligence community accurately forecast the key developments that have bedeviled our efforts in post-war Iraq?
The agencies certainly raised the possibility of sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia Iraqis. But this possibility played only a small part in the overall analysis, and was treated optimistically:
For the most part, Iraqi Shia and Sunni have lived peacefully together and do not have a legacy of sectarian strife. Nevertheless, the threat of Shia reprisals for the oppression they have suffered under Saddam’s rule is a major concern to the Sunni elite and could erupt if not prevented by an occupying force.
There was no hint that such “prevention” might prove impossible, and no reference to the development of an “insurgency” such as we have witnessed.
One critical factor over the last four years has been al Qaeda’s strategy of fomenting violence between Sunni and Shia, most notoriously by blowing up the Samarra mosque. These intelligence reports did not foresee that strategy. They suggested, in a general way, that a war in Iraq could be the occasion for heightened activity by al Qaeda. But they expected this to be mostly outside, not inside, Iraq:
Iraq itself still might not be one of al Qa'ida's favored locations for attacks, given the group's greater operational presence elsewhere.
To be fair, the CIA did make the obvious point that al Qaeda could try to collaborate with its Iraqi affiliate, Ansar al Islam—a risk that was addressed early in the war by destroying Ansar’s facilities in northern Iraq:
Al Qa'ida, nonetheless, probably would try to exploit any postwar transition in Iraq by replicating the tactics it has used in Afghanistan during the past year to mount hit-and-run operations against US personnel. Support for these operations would come from its network on the Arabian Peninsula and its Kurdish associates in northeastern Iraq.
What is completely missing from these intelligence reports, however, is any recognition that al Qaeda would decide to make Iraq the central front in its war on civilization. In a single sentence—the last sentence of the Principal Challenges report—the agencies raised the possibility that rogue ex-Saddam elements might cooperate with terrorist groups to attack Coalition troops:
In addition, rogue ex-regime elements could forge an alliance with existing terrorist organizations or act independently to wage guerrilla warfare against the new government or Coalition forces.
But there was no suggestion that this possibility was either likely or especially important to Iraq’s long-term future.
What about the role played by Iran in training and arming both Shia and Sunni insurgents? The CIA foresaw the general likelihood that Iran might meddle, but didn’t predict that it would train and arm insurgents:
Some elements in the Iranian government could decide to try to counter aggressively the US presence in Iraq or challenge US goals following the fall of Saddam by attempting to use contacts in the Kurdish and Shia communities to sow dissent against the US presence and complicate the formation of a new, pro-US government.Elements in the regime also could employ their own operatives against US personnel, although this approach would be hard to conceal.
Further, nothing in these intelligence reports predicted the tactics that Iraqi insurgents, and their Iranian suppliers, have used to such deadly effect. They contain no references to IEDs or suicide bombings.
The Intelligence Council did offer what it called a “worst case scenario.” It is revealing to note what was included, and what was not included, in the “worst case” that the intelligence community could foresee:
In the worst case, Saddam uses chemical or biological weapons against his own people and Coalition forces and destroys Iraqi oil facilities and dams either to slow an attack or deny the benefits to any successor government.Blowing up oil wells or burning them would create significant air pollution and increase the number of people seeking refuge elsewhere.
***
Existing medical facilities simply would be unable to cope with widespread use of chemical or biological weapons.
Taken in their entirety, the Intelligence Council’s reports cannot be seen as prescient. They said that the road to democracy would be hard and there was potential for violence. Well, sure. But, when we look at the details of the agencies’ predictions, we find that, where they were not hopelessly hedged, they were wrong at least as often as they were right.
Moreover, there is much in the reports that weighed in favor of removing Saddam. They confidently asserted that Iraq possessed WMDs, and, as everyone knew, Saddam had a history of using them. Further, they acknowledged that Iraq had been a significant sponsor of terrorism. From the Regional Consequences report:
Iraq has increased its financial support and training for Palestinian terrorist groups over the past year, and some Iraqi payments to Palestinian groups have gone to the families of members of HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.
The agencies advised that a post-Saddam Iraq would be less inclined to support terrorism:
A new Iraqi government would have little interest in supporting terrorism.
And again:
A new Iraqi regime would be less inclined than Saddam to support terrorism….
The Intelligence Council also held out hope that regime change in Iraq could have positive consequences throughout the Middle East:
Over the longer run, an outcome that installed a credible Iraqi regime and visibly improved Iraqi living conditions would increase the willingness of regional governments to cooperate with the United States.
The Council suggested that conditions in Iran, especially, could benefit from deposing Saddam:
The country where regime change in Iraq would have the best chance to tip the political balance in favor of reform is Iran as both reformers and hardliners would probe for advantages. A quick and decisive Coalition victory in Iraq most likely would strengthen the hand of reformers favoring engagement and democracy-building at home as the best way to forestall a U.S. attack.
Putting all of this together, is it fair for Pillar to suggest that his reports demonstrated that the war against Saddam’s Iraq was a “fool’s errand?” I think not. Everyone knew that bringing freedom and democracy to the Arab Middle East would not be easy. Through modern history, it has been hard to go wrong by predicting failure for any venture associated with the Arab world. But President Bush did not have the luxury of ignoring the Arabs, nor was he deceived by irrelevancies about Israel and the Palestinians. He was looking for a long-term solution to the problem if Islamic terrorism, and the Intelligence Council told him that Iraq possessed WMDs; that Iraq was supporting terrorist groups; that a post-Saddam Iraq would have little reason to support terrorists; and that deposing Saddam could have a beneficent effect on other regimes throughout the region, including Iran’s. They reported that implanting democracy would be difficult, as everyone knew, but certainly didn’t suggest that it would be impossible. They noted a number of factors that made Iraq promising soil, by Arab standards, for the experiment.
I have no idea how much weight President Bush gave to these intelligence reports. Maybe, by January 2003, he had given up on getting any meaningful input from agencies that were far more interested in protecting their own images and budgets, and perhaps in undermining an administration that did not share their overwhelmingly liberal and Democratic orientation, than in going out on a limb to give the President their best judgment. But, to the extent that President Bush heeded what the Intelligence Council told him in late 2002 and early 2003, it is simply false to say that he disregarded a warning that a war with Iraq would be a “fool’s errand.”
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