The Crystal Ball Changes Its Mind
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence released a National Intelligence Estimate ("Key Judgments" only) on Iran's nuclear program today. You can download the report at the DNI web site. For some, the report was an occasion for reflexive Bush-bashing; this Reuters article, widely read since it was featured on Yahoo News, is headlined "Report contradicts Bush on Iran nuclear program." Reuters begins:
A new U.S. intelligence report says Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and it remains on hold, contradicting the Bush administration's earlier assertion that Tehran was intent on developing a bomb.
This lead paragraph is ridiculous, given that, if you read a bit further, Reuters acknowledges that today's report "marked a sharp contrast to an intelligence report two years ago that stated Iran was 'determined to develop nuclear weapons.'" In other words, the intelligence community has changed its mind.
The Associated Press, to its credit, did much better in its article, titled US Officials: Iran Has Nuke Capability, which begins:
Iran halted its nuclear weapons development program in the fall of 2003 under international pressure but is continuing to enrich uranium, which means it may still be able to develop a weapon between 2010 and [sic] senior intelligence officials said Monday.That finding, in a new National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, is a change from two years ago, when U.S. intelligence agencies believed Tehran was determined to develop a nuclear capability and was continuing its weapons development program.
What has changed since 2005? Apparently the CIA or another agency has gotten credible information that, in the words of the NIE, "in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." A footnote explains:
For the purposes of this Estimate, by “nuclear weapons program” we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.
The NIE attributes Iran's 2003 retreat as a response to pressure by the Bush administration and other countries. As far as that goes, it is good news and a credit to the administration's policies toward Iran.
The report certainly does not suggest, however, that there is any reason for complacency with regard to the mullahs. Here are a few excerpts:
We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program.)
We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.
We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon.
That's sort of reassuring. I guess.
We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon.We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating them.
We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.
We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.
Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so.
For strategic purposes, this conclusion seems most relevant:
We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment, only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision is inherently reversible.
What always strikes me about these National Intelligence Estimates, as well as other intelligence reports that have been made public, is how little intelligence they seem to reflect. Thus, for example, the current report says:
We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart the program.
Apparently one or more tidbits of information have convinced our intelligence community that Iran suspended its weapons development program in 2003. Today's report, however, acknowledges that we have no particular insight into the current intentions of the Iranian government. Maybe the CIA really does have some good Iranian sources, and maybe we really do have some concrete information about what is going on in Tehran, and maybe today's report is a bit of misdirection directed at Ahmadinejad and the mullahs. More likely, though, our intelligence is just as fragmentary as the NIE suggests.
If there is a bottom line to today's report, it is that Iran may be more susceptible to influence via international sanctions, etc., than we had thought. If that is true, it is good news. But the report offers no reason to be less concerned about the likelihood that Iran will possess nuclear weapons in the near future, and no reason to doubt that our own willingness to take military action is one of the factors that will influence decision-making in Tehran.
UPDATE: Tom Joscelyn asks five questions about the NIE.
SCOTT adds: And Norman Podhoretz gives voice to dark suspicions about the NIE.
PAUL adds: I assess with moderate to high confidence that the CIA is a joke. Take the claim that Iran halted its nuclear program in 2003 in response to international pressure. How does the CIA know that this is what caused Iran to take this action (assuming it actually did halt the program)? Isn't it far more likely that Iran would have been motivated by fear of U.S. military action. After all, we had just taken out the regimes in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan. I assess with moderate confidence that the CIA (and the intelligence community as a whole) is engaging in politically-motivated speculation, not legitimate intelligence, here.
I further assess with high confidence that we should ignore the NIE assessment of Iran's nuclear program (has the CIA ever been correct about the status of a secretive foreign power's weapons program?) and defer to Israeli intelligence.
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