Rumsfeld's issues, and Sullivan's
Andrew Sullivan presents his case for sacking Rumsfeld. We've discussed the arguments Sullivan raises, but now I want to look at some of Sullivan's underlying themes, all of which are fairly common to arguments calling for Rumsfeld's scalp. Note first the attempt to attribute our problems in Iraq to the alleged personality flaws of American policy makers. To Sullivan, the insurgency and "chaos" in Iraq is not about the recidivism and determination of enemy forces, and the inherent difficulties of eradicating them in a huge country; it's down, instead, to the "stubbornness" of Rumsfeld and Bush. This way of thinking is related to an unwillingness to accept contingency in war time. Thus, Rumsfeld's statement regarding post-invasion looting ("stuff happens") is met with this response -- "No it doesn’t. When you don’t have a plan to contain post-liberation chaos, looting breaks out." In Sullivan's cosmos (as in John Kerry's) all that's needed to ward off looting or other traditional side-effects of war is "a plan." Related to this mindset is an unwillingness to accept limitations. For example, Sullivan holds Rumsfeld responsible "for the lack of equipment that has left soldiers vulnerable to injury." He seems to be referring to the fact raised during Rumsfeld's meeting with troops that some humvees (a small percentage, it seems) lack armor. Has there ever been a war when procurement has perfectly matched the needs of soldiers at all times?
Finally, there's the distress that Sullivan and others experience when Rumsfeld has the nerve to remind critics of limitations and contingencies. Since this "bad news" is unacceptable, those who bear it are deemed arrogant, stubborn, or flippant.
Is there a mega-theme that ties all of this together? One candidate is the modern liberal view that the state can accomplish anything. However, Sullivan does not appear to be a statist in that sense, nor is Bill Kristol. Maybe it has more to do with baby-boomer traits -- a sense of entitlement and the demand for instant gratification. This might explain why it's particularly galling to have a pre-boom Defense Secretary refusing, a bit snidely perhaps, to confess error when "stuff happens." All the worse when the geezer isn't even sensitive enough to sign letters of condolence. In any case, I doubt that during World War II there was a comparable hue and cry about the absence of a "plan" and the failure to own up to responsibility every time we suffered a setback.
HINDROCKET adds: Christopher Harrington writes:
That Andrew would bring up "looting" shows how desperate (and Democratized) he's become. To answer critics of the conduct of the war he wrote:Look what didn't happen. There was no attack on Israel; Iran didn't intervene; Turkey didn't invade; chemical and biological weapons were not used. These weren't accidents. They were a function of an extremely intelligent and flexible war-plan, one that combined special forces, air-power, high-tech weaponry, local fighters, and old fashioned infantry in a military-technological nexus the like of which has simply never been seen on earth before . . . Of course, as you read this, the press will be touting the new "disaster" of post-war chaos. The refrain of "losing the peace after winning the war" will be deafening.April 14, 2003
I suppose Andrew would say that he's changed his mind because a year and a half later, there is still violence in Iraq. But that doesn't negate anything he said last year, and if looting didn't discredit the war effort in April 2003, when the looting was at its height, why does it discredit the war effort now?
