Whither Pakistan?
As Stanley Kurtz says, the only answer one can venture to that question at this point is: who knows? But Kurtz's article represents an excellent starting point in attempting to speculate about what happens next.
Kurtz argues, among other things, that Musharraf is probably correct in claiming that his actions, and those of his army, are reasonable measures to protect Pakistan from the jihadists. While Musharraf’s critics insist that the way to halt the spread of Islamism in Pakistan is to take power away from the army and hand it to a secular middle class capable of transmitting modern and liberal mores to the country as a whole, that claim seems implausible. As Kurtz explains:
Pakistan’s government has never faced armed, independent, organized, and territorially based Islamist opposition on today’s scale. . . .In calmer circumstances, a stable democracy guided by a secular middle-class might have headed off the specter of Islamist radicalism. Today, however, given the size and strength of the Islamist threat, and given the unique social role of Pakistan’s army, a military government may be the only real bulwark against the potential disaster of a nuclear-armed al-Qaedastan.
Accordingly, Secretary Rice's decision to re-assess our aid package to Pakistan looks like the wrong reaction, and the possible precursor to yet another serious mistake on her part. As Hugh Hewitt puts it, "you have to wonder if the careerist-dominated Department of State is pushing for a replay of Iran, 1978 or South Vietnam, 1963." In those instances, "the U.S. wished for a better alternative than what they had, and ended up with far, far worse." And "this time the troubling ally has nukes."
UPDATE: David Frum argues:
What is happening in Pakistan underscores the dangerously symbiotic relationship between authoritarianism and extremism in the Islamic world. Musharraf needs extremists to justify his authoritarianism - and the extremists in turn need him to crowd out more rational alternatives. It's a relationship visible in Egypt and the Gulf as well. Which is why - out of fashion though it may be, neglected even by the president who articulated it - the Bush doctrine will be back. In the long run, free institutions are the only antidote to ideological and religious fanaticism.
In this case, though, I think short-term thinking needs to carry the day, for the reasons advanced by Stanley Kurtz. The Bush doctrine makes sense only as a general guide, not as something like an iron rule that we always support and press for the most democratic option regardless of the situation and the stakes. The "iron rule" version of the Bush doctrine won't "be back." In fact, I don't believe it was ever present.
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