Surrealism and the crisis in Pakistan
While President Bush’s policy towards Pakistan in recent days may or may not be consistent with the principles of foreign policy realism (see below), the approach taken by some members of Congress is downright surrealistic. Yesterday, Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte reminded members of the House Foreign Policy Committee that “no country has done more in terms of inflicting damage and punishment on the Taliban and al Qaeda since 9/11” than Pakistan under President Musharraf. If one excludes the U.S., that statement seems indisputable. Yet a coalition of liberal and conservative members was having none of it.
Gary Ackerman (D-N.Y.) complained that “instead of arresting the terrorists who pose an existential threat to his regime [Musharraf] is arresting the very people with whom he could have worked to generate the political support necessary to rid Pakistan of extremists.” But arresting the terrorists in the western provinces is not an option unless and until the military subdues the terrorist forces there. And to subdue these terrorists requires above all the support of the military, not the support of lawyers and politicians.
Dan Burton (R-Ind.), channeling Jimmy Carter’s point man on Iran Gary Sick, warned that “if we’re not careful , we’re going to see the same thing happen that happened in Iran, and Pakistan is a nuclear power.” But there’s a strong case that the Shah’s government fell because the Carter administration refused to back it, thus demoralizing those in the government and the military to the point that they were more inclined to abdicate than to fight on behalf of the regime. The Carter administration refused to back the Shah for moral/aesthetic reasons, and ended up with an implacably hostile regime with far less moral and aesthetic appeal.
Bill Delahunt (D-Mass.) fretted that the U.S. will be seen as “the epitome of hypocrisy if we don’t make a clear stand for democracy. . .in Pakistan.” But Delahunt did not explain why our foreign policy be determined solely by a desire to avoid hypocrisy rather than by a weighing of all the advantages and disadvantages of a given option?
Dana Rohrbacher (R-Calif.) bellowed that it is too late for Musharraf to give up his command of the military in exchange for remaining president, and that “it is time for him to go.” Rohrbacher called Musharraf a “political juggler instead of a leader” and “a chameleon instead of a bold opponent to radical to Islam.” But Rohrbacher provided no reason to believe that a new government would provide bold, or even effective, opposition to radical Islam. Nor did he provide any evidence to contradict Negroponte’s testimony that Pakistan under Musharraf has done more to inflict damage and punishment on the Taliban and al Qaeda than any other ally.
Ed Royce (R-Calif.) disputed Negroponte’s claim that Musharraf is an “indispensable” ally. “The one that’s indispensable in Pakistan is the rule of law,” Royce sniffed. But a more sober assessment would hold that, while the rule of law is desirable in Pakistan, what’s indispensable is that the government (with its nuclear stockpile) be led by someone not hostile to the U.S.
The administration may be tilting too much in favor of Musharraf, too much against him, or it may be playing things just right. This is much is clear, though: Congress doesn’t have a clue which one of these possibilities is the case.
