Rumsfeld's Parting Advice
Donald Rumsfeld wrote a memo laying out options for Iraq two days before he was sacked. The full text is here. The memo will be spun in the usual ways; the best thing is to read it for yourself. It isn't very long.
What strikes me most about the memo is how similar Rumsfeld's recommendations are to what we have been doing for some time. He divides alternatives into two categories: "above the line" and "below the line." The below the line alternatives are, Rumsfeld says, "less attractive options."
But the more attractive options sound very familiar. For example:
Significantly increase U.S. trainers and embeds, and transfer more U.S. equipment to Iraqi Security forces (ISF), to further accelerate their capabilities by refocusing the assignment of some significant portion of the U.S. troops currently in Iraq.
Isn't this exactly what we've been doing for the last year or two?
Conduct an accelerated draw-down of U.S. bases. We have already reduced from 110 to 55 bases. Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and to 5 bases by July 2007.
Again, this is obviously already in progress, as Rumsfeld acknowledges. Some of Rumsfeld's ideas seem sensible, but, again, modest tweaks to our present policies:
Publicly announce a set of benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi Government and the U.S. — political, economic and security goals — to chart a path ahead for the Iraqi government and Iraqi people (to get them moving) and for the U.S. public (to reassure them that progress can and is being made).Initiate an approach where U.S. forces provide security only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate, with the stipulation being that unless they cooperate fully, U.S. forces would leave their province.
Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was done in Fallujah when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding good behavior. Put our reconstruction efforts in those parts of Iraq that are behaving, and invest and create havens of opportunity to reward them for their good behavior. As the old saying goes, “If you want more of something, reward it; if you want less of something, penalize it.” No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence.
Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start “taking our hand off the bicycle seat”), so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.
This suggestion sounds a bit like Paul's idea that we should stop trying to police Baghdad, and focus on defeating al Qaeda in Anbar:
Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions — cities, patrolling, etc. — and move U.S. forces to a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.
This one mystifies me. Why in the world wasn't it done a long time ago? Or if we have been attempting it, how are we going to do so more successfully?
Position substantial U.S. forces near the Iranian and Syrian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi Government.
Some of Rumsfeld's ideas do sound like more substantial departures, like bribing clerics:
Provide money to key political and religious leaders (as Saddam Hussein did), to get them to help us get through this difficult period.
Here, Rumsfeld implies a high level of frustration with U.S. agencies other than his own DOD:
Aggressively beef up the Iraqi MOD and MOI, and other Iraqi ministries critical to the success of the ISF — the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Planning, Health, Criminal Justice, Prisons, etc. — by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve/National Guard volunteers (i.e., give up on trying to get other USG Departments to do it.)
The conventional wisdom is that both President Bush's firing of Rumsfeld, and the timing thereof, were dictated by political considerations. On the whole, I still think that is right. But reading Rumsfeld's final memo does raise another possibility: perhaps Bush read the memo and decided that, if the current leadership of the Defense Department couldn't come up with any ideas that represented a more significant departure from our existing policies, he would give someone else a shot.
Be that as it may, the reality is that there is no quick or easy fix for Iraq. What we have been doing isn't dumb, and it has been by no means completely unsuccessful. It sounds as though we can adjust course somewhat by, as Rumsfeld suggests, being more consistent about punishing bad behavior and rewarding good behavior. But the real change needs to come from the Iraqi people, not from us. The Iraqis will not have a functioning democracy--or, more important, a "normal" country--unless they--and by "they" I mean nearly all Iraqis, not a bare majority--want one. Absent that kind of commitment from the Iraqis themselves, our options are quite limited.
