It seems unlikely that President Trump will choose to leave the Strait of Hormuz under the control of the Iranian thugocracy. Can he really leave the Strait in a condition worse for us than it was before the commencement of the current hostilities? It makes it hard to claim victory. It would in fact represent a significant defeat.
The Institute for the Study of War has posted this Iran Update Special Report dated July 9 (data cutoff at 2:00 p.m.). The bolded sentences are in the original. Endnotes are posted here:
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Iran is threatening the resumption of large-scale conflict by striking civilian vessels and the Gulf states to try to achieve permanent control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has launched numerous strikes targeting commercial vessels and the Gulf states in recent days as part of a broader effort to secure control over the strait despite apparent resistance from the Gulf states.[1] Clause 5 of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) requires Iran to discuss the “future administration and maritime services” of the strait with Oman and other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with “applicable international law.”[2] A senior US administration official told the Daily Wire on June 17 that clause 5 was designed with the assumption that Gulf states would moderate Iran’s position vis-a-vis the strait through the discussions required by the clause.[3] This assumption did not take into account that Iran could fail to reach an agreement with the Gulf states and resort to using force to impose its desired “future administration” of the strait on these states. Iranian officials initially attempted to frame Iran’s post-war approach to the strait’s management as part of a new regional security framework that would ultimately benefit the Gulf states.[4] Iranian officials have since become much more hostile toward the Gulf states due to these states’ opposition to Iranian efforts to control the strait.[5] Iranian officials have explicitly stated that Oman and other Gulf states cannot prevent Iran from asserting control over the strait.[6] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi stated on June 29 that Iran would implement its “sovereignty and new policy” in the strait even if Iran and Oman failed to reach an agreement on the waterway’s future management, for example.[7] Iran’s continued attacks on civilian vessels and Gulf states in recent days demonstrate that the Iranian regime prioritizes control of the strait over avoiding renewed large-scale conflict with the United States. Iran’s attacks also illustrate that Iran views control over the strait as its primary strategic deterrent and that Iran is unlikely to abandon its efforts to control the strait in response to opposition from the Gulf states.
The United States struck 90 targets across Iran on July 8 to degrade Iran’s ability to attack international shipping.[8] Recent US strikes have had no visible effect on Iran’s ability to threaten shipping, and it is unclear when these strikes would have an effect on Iran’s ability or willingness to threaten shipping. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on July 8 that US forces conducted strikes in Iran targeting air defense systems, coastal surveillance assets, missile and drone storage sites, naval capabilities, and military logistics infrastructure along Iran’s southern coastline. These strikes were in response to Iranian strikes on civilian vessels in the strait on July 6 and 7.[9] CENTCOM conducted similar strikes on July 7.[10] Geolocated footage shows damage from US strikes to a reported maritime traffic control tower at Chabahar Port, which is on Iran’s southeastern border along the Gulf of Oman.[11] Geolocated footage also shows damage to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Shahid Asarinejad barracks in Shiraz, Fars Province.[12] The United States has repeatedly conducted limited strikes in southern Iran since the MoU came into effect, targeting similar sites as it did on July 8. These targets include radars, communications nodes, and air defense systems.[13] Iran has continued to attack commercial vessels, however, relying on its ability to fire only a small number of projectiles into the strait to hit individual ships and thereby compel commercial vessels to abide by Iran’s illegal traffic separation scheme.[14] A member of the Iranian negotiating team, Mehdi Mohammadi, emphasized on July 9 that recent US attacks have not changed Iran’s ability or willingness to control the strait.[15]
The United States also struck bridges and railroads used by the Iranian armed forces to transport missiles, drones, weapons components, and other material for military reconstitution, according to US officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[16] The United States struck a railway in Golestan Province in northeastern Iran that Iranian media stated was used to transport goods from Russia.[17] IRGC-affiliated outlet Fars News reported that Chinese train traffic along the route has tripled since the United States launched its naval blockade on Iranian ports.[18] Russia and China have helped Iran try to reconstitute its drone and missile programs, such as by providing Iran with drone technology and missile components, respectively.[19]
Iranian forces launched missiles and drones at Bahrain, Kuwait, and a US base in Jordan in response to the US strikes. All of the Iranian projectiles were intercepted.[20] Iran likely calculates that attacks against Gulf states will increase pressure on the United States to avoid further military escalation by threatening US forces and raising the costs for US allies.
